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Abstract
A large body of literature in International Economics has analysed the impact of in-
creased import competition on domestic rms. The link between rm-level exports and
changes in the competitive environment on foreign markets is less well understood, however.
This is despite the fact that exports make up a signicant and growing share of total manu-
facturing production in most countries. We derive a theory-based econometric specication
linking destination-specic exports to foreign demand and the degree of competitiveness or
crowdedness of a foreign market. The latter is a summary measure of the number and
productive e¢ ciency of rms competing in a given market and the barriers impeding their
access, such as tari¤s or physical distance. We estimate this specication on a large sample
of Italian manufacturing rms in 1992-2003 and use the results for a series of counterfactual
experiments. Our ndings indicate that increased numbers and e¢ ciency of foreign rms
and improvements in their access to destination markets have reduced Italian exports by
around 0.2-0.4% per year. This is similar to the e¤ects of tari¤ reductions for Italian rms
(+0.3%/year) but smaller than the impact of higher unit labour costs (-1.4%/year) and less
favourable exchange rates (-2.0%/year). By far the most important determinant of export
performance was foreign demand growth, however, raising Italian exports by up to 5.3%
per year or almost 60% over the sample period. Our results also indicate that Chinas im-
pact on Italian export performance is small and if anything positive. Much more important
in explaining the loss of export market shares in recent years has been the relatively slow
demand growth in Italys main export market, the EU15.
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1 Introduction
Exports make up a large and growing share of total manufacturing sales in most industrialized
economies. For example, the ratio of total manufacturing exports to production in 2003 was 16%
for the USA, 42% for the UK, 47% for Germany and over 70% for small open economies such as
Belgium, Denmark or the Netherlands. For all OECD countries, this ratio was on average 53% in
2003, up from 35% in 1990 and 24% in 1970 (OECD STAN, 2005). At the same time there have
been growing concerns in industrialized countries about the rise of large emerging economies -
Brazil, India and especially China - and the threatthis poses to domestic exporters. Given
the increasing importance of foreign markets for manufacturing sales, what impact will these
changes have on rms in developed economies? More generally, how do competitive conditions
on foreign markets a¤ect exports of domestic rms? Are these conditions key determinants of
export success or are other factors such as foreign demand or rm-level unit labour costs more
important?
In this paper, we use a large dataset on Italian manufacturing rms to address these ques-
tions. We employ a rm-level gravity model to derive an econometric specication linking
destination-specic exports to rm characteristics, foreign demand and the competition inten-
sity or crowdedness of foreign markets.1 This latter variable will be at the centre of our
analysis. In essence, it is a measure of the number and e¢ ciency of rms competing in a given
market and the barriers impeding their access, such as tari¤s or physical distance. It summarizes
how easy or di¢ cult it will be for an exporter to penetrate a given market, holding constant
other factors such as foreign demand or unit costs of the exporting rm. The principal goal of
this paper is to quantify the role of market crowding and its components and to compare their
quantitative importance to other determinants of export performance.
We proceed in three steps. Having derived our econometric specication, we estimate it
on a large sample of Italian manufacturing rms in 1992-2003. We nd that market crowding
has a robust negative impact on rm-level exports across a wide range of specications and
that its e¤ect operates both along the extensive and the intensive margin. We also show that
the same does not hold true for a number of alternative, non-theory based measures of foreign
competition intensity.
We then examine the quantitative importance of our ndings more closely by performing a
series of counterfactual experiments. Our ndings indicate that increased numbers and e¢ ciency
of foreign rms and improvements in their access to destination markets have reduced Italian
exports by around 0.2-0.4% per year. This is similar to the e¤ects of tari¤ reductions for Italian
rms (+0.3%/year) but smaller than the impact of higher unit labour costs (-1.4%/year) and
less favourable exchange rates (-2.0%/year). By far the most important determinant of export
performance was foreign demand growth, however, raising Italian exports by up to 5.3% per
year or almost 60% over the sample period. Our results also indicate that Chinas impact on
Italian export performance is small and if anything positive at around +0.2%/year. Much more
important in explaining the loss of export market shares in recent years has been the relatively
1The New Economic Geography literature also uses the term "market crowding". We use these expressions
in the rest of the paper since - as will become clear below - our measure is somewhat di¤erent from the standard
usage of the word "competition intensity" in indudstrial organization.
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slow demand growth in Italys main export market, the EU15.
We believe that these ndings are important for a number of reasons. From a policy per-
spective, Italy is an interesting case to study since its exporters have been losing world market
shares for over a decade. This is often linked in public debates to the emergence of competitors
from low-wage countries like China which compete head to head in traditional Italian export
sectors such as apparel or textiles. Our nding that the increased crowdedness of foreign mar-
kets is not the principal determinant of Italian export performance sheds some doubts on this
conjecture.
Our ndings also contribute to the wider issue of rm-level responses to trade integration.
The traditional focus of this literature has been on the e¤ects of import penetration on a rms
home market, particularly in the wake of trade liberalizations (see e.g. Pavcnik, 2002, and
Treer, 2004, for two recent inuential contributions; Tybout, 2001, provides a survey of the
earlier literature). In contrast, our analysis quanties - among other things - the e¤ects of lower
trade barriers on foreign markets. While the two issues are evidently related, there are also
important di¤erences. First, exporting rms are usually quite di¤erent from purely domestic
rms. As previous research has shown, exporters tend to be larger, more productive, use
more capital intensive production and employ a more highly skilled workforce (see for example
Bernard and Jensen, 1995 and 1999; Wagner, 2007, and Greenaway and Kneller, 2007, provide
surveys of the literature). Secondly, exporters will have more options at their disposition to
react to increased market crowding than purely domestic rms for example, redirecting exports
to less crowded markets. On the other hand, the set of potential intervention mechanisms
available to policy makers is more limited. This is because traditional instruments for protecting
domestic rms from import penetration (tari¤s, quotas) are evidently not available to national
governments in this new setting. Taken together, these considerations suggest that the reaction
of exporters to changes on foreign markets might be quite di¤erent from the reactions of domestic
rms to increased import penetration which have been studied so far.
From a methodological point of view, our empirical measure of market crowding provides a
new way of analysing what Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) label multilateral resistance. As
these authors explain, controlling for the multilateral resistance (or crowdedness) of a market
is necessary to obtain consistent parameter estimates in gravity equation estimations. We
go beyond simply controlling for multilateral resistance and decompose it into its di¤erent
components - number and e¢ ciency of competitors and the barriers impeding their access
(tari¤s, distance etc.).
Our analysis is also related to recent contributions by Redding and Venables (2003), Hanson
and Robertson (2006) and Bernard and Jensen (2003). The rst two papers use gravity models
to decompose changes in South-East Asian and Mexican exports, respectively, into contributions
of the supply characteristics of the exporting countries and foreign market conditions. They
rely on country-level trade data, however, which prevents them from analysing the potentially
heterogenous impact of foreign markets conditions across rms - which is an important part of
our analysis. They also do not separate out the role played by foreign demand and the various
components of market crowding. Bernard and Jensen regress growth rates of U.S. rm-level
exports in 1987-1992 on exchange rate variations, rm productivity and a measure of foreign
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income. They do not analyse the role of export market crowding and their data do not allow a
destination specic analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model of rm-level export
behaviour and introduces our empirical measure of market crowding. Section 3 describes the
data and section 4 presents econometric results. Section 5 uses our estimates for various coun-
terfactual experiments and a decomposition of Italian rm-level exports. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
We base our empirical analysis on a partial equilibrium model of rm-export behaviour. Firms
make market-specic export decisions taking expenditure, the number of competitors on each
market, their marginal cost and the trade costs of serving a market as given. To illustrate
what we mean by the "crowdedness" of a market n in this context, consider the following
uncompensated demand function facing an Italian rm i from sector s on market n:
dins = d(pins; ens; pns)
In this expression, pins denotes the price charged by rm i on market n, sector s, and ens is a
vector of consumersexpenditures in market n and sector s. The vector pn denotes the prices
charged by rm is competitors active on the same market. These competitors can be local
rms or other foreign exporters. By "market crowding" we understand a summary measure of
the price vector pn (e.g. a price index) and its e¤ect will be summarized by the corresponding
cross-price elasticities of demand.
To make this approach operational, we have to choose a particular demand system and price
setting mechanism. Following the vast majority of research in internation trade, we assume that
rms face CES demand and operate under monopolistic competition. This framework has a
number of advantages over possible alternatives, both in terms of empirical predictions and
analytical convenience. Most importantly, CES demand generates a log-linear specication
relating exports to importer and exporter characteristics and bilateral trade costs. As a large
empirical literature on gravity equation estimation has shown, this specication provides an
excellent t to international trade data at di¤erent levels of aggregation and is indeed the most
successful device we have for explaining bilateral trade ows (see Anderson and van Wincoop,
2004, and Disdier and Head, 2007, for recent overviews). Our framework also has the obvious
advantage of comparability with existing theoretical and empirical work which mostly also builds
on similar frameworks (e.g. Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Helpman et al., 2007). Third,
CES allows to conveniently summarize the degree of market crowding in a single measure, the
CES price index. Finally, the assumption of monopolistic competition will allow us to derive
prices as log-linear functions of observable rm characteristics and bilateral variables such as
import tari¤s.
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2.1 Firm-level exports
Assume thus that consumers in market n have identical CES preferences over the di¤erent
varieties produced by rms in sector s. The demand facing any rm i in this sector from
market n then takes the form
dins = p
 s
ins P
s 1
ns Ens (1)
where pins is the c.i.f. price charged by the rm in market n, Ens is total industry-specic
expenditure in market n and s denotes the elasticity of substitution between varieties in in-
dustry s. Pn =
P
j
R
ijns
p1 sins di
 1
1 s is the CES price index which measures the degree of
crowdedness on market n. The index j denotes all countries exporting to n while ijns denotes
exporters from these countries. In our data, each rm is classied into a single industry, so we
drop the subscript s from rm-specic variables from now on.
In order to enter a foreign market, rms have to make upfront investments such as adapting
products to local standards or setting up distribution channels (see Roberts and Tybout, 1997;
Bernard and Jensen, 2004). The costs of doing so are equal to Fin. Firms also incur variable
trade costs when exporting. These are  ij   1 in terms of the exported good for each unit
shipped to market n. Finally, revenues from market n have to be converted back to the home
markets currency at the exchange rate ein, expressed as units of the home currency per foreign
currency unit.
With monoplistic competition, rms set prices at a constant markup over marginal costs,
i.e. pin = ss 1 incie
 1
n .
2 We assume that the marginal costs of production, ci, are constant.
The choice of export price and quantity on market n is thus independent of the situation on
other markets. With this pricing rule, the value of exports by rm i to market n is
rin = pindin =

s
s   1
1 s
1 sin e
s 1
n c
1 s
i P
s 1
ns Ens (2)
and the price index can be expressed as
Pn =

s
s   1
0@X
j
1 sjn e
s 1
jn njns
R
ijns
c1 sijns di
njns
1A1=(1 s)
where njns is the number of rms from j exporting to market n.
Note that rms will only export if the variable prots from doing so are at least equal to the
initial setup costs Fin. Noting that variable prots are in = enrins , we obtain a market entry
condition for rm i in terms of its marginal costs, setup costs Fin, market specic characteristics
and bilateral trade costs. That is, rm i will enter a market n if and only if:
2We also experimented with alternative frameworks allowing for variable price-cost margins (e.g. Ottaviano
and Melitz, 2007). However, the absence of income e¤ects and the linearity of the resulting demand functions
resulted in a substantially lower t of our rm-level export regressions. In any case, our empirical proxy for the
CES price index will be more general than its theoretical counterpart. Its components will capture both the
direct e¤ect of market crowding on rm-level demand (present in the model) and the indirect e¤ect via reduced
price-cost margins (absent from our model).
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Din 
 
esn (s   1)s 1EnsP s 1ns
cs 1in Fin
s 1
ins 
s
s
!1=(s 1)
 1 (3)
Expressions (2) and (3) form the basis our econometric specications. We can summarize a
rms export decision as
rin =
8<:

s
s 1
1 s
1 sin e
s 1
in c
1 s
i P
s 1
ns Ens if Din  1
0 otherwise
(4)
To reiterate, by estimating (4) we perform a partial equilibrium analysis taking the number
of competitiors and their prices, exchange rates, as well as foreign demand as given. In general
equilibrium, these will be determined as a function of underlying taste and technology parame-
ters. We believe, however, that a partial equilibrium approach is better suited here since nding
empirical proxies for the right-hand side elements of (4) is relatively straightforward - which is
not true for the underlying parameters determining them. The direct econometric implication
of our partial equilibrium framework is that we have to assume that individual Italian rms
inuence on the destination-specic variables in (4) is negligible. Given that the average share
of rms in our sample in the total sales volume of foreign markets is less than 0.0025%, we
believe that reverse causality issues are indeed unlikely and this assumption thus justiable.3
2.2 Choice of empirical proxies
We now turn to the choice of empirical proxies for the variables in (2) and (3).
Market Crowding - CES Price Index An empirical proxy for the price index Pn requires
data on 1 sjns , e
s 1
jn , njns, and n
 1
jns
R
ijns
c1 sijns di. Exchange rate data are easily obtainable.
However, we want to allow for imperfect exchange rate pass through and thus proxy ejn =
1ex
1
jn where exjn denotes the bilateral exchange rate between j and n, and 1 and 1 are
parameters to be estimated below.
We do not have internationally comparable data on the number of exporters (njns) and
individual rmsmarginal costs (ci) for all countries j appearing in Pns (see section 3 for a
description of our sample). We thus write the number of exporters njns as a function of the
number of establishments in country j, sector s, multiplied by the share of n in country js
exports. That is, njns = 2 (estjs  sharejn)2  22jn . This reects the empirical regularity
observed by Kramarz et al (2004) - and present in our data as well - that a larger fraction of
domestic rms exports to more important destination markets. Note that the parameters 2
and 2 allow for added exibility in this specication.
We further assume that n 1jns
R
ijns
c1 ijns di is proportional to the average unit labour costs
(the total wage bill divided by value added) in sector s, country j. That is, n 1jns
R
ijns
c1 ijns di =
3 (ucjs)
3(1 s). We show in appendix B that a su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that
3Even for the EU15, Italys main export market, the average rms market share is just 0.004%. There are of
course other endogeneity concerns arising from potential omitted variable bias. We address these in a number of
ways below.
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value added production functions are Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, rms within
a given sector and country have the same level of total factor productivity, and the cost of
capital is either identical across sectors and countries or proportional to wages or total factor
productivity. Again, the inclusion of the parameters 3 and 3 increases the degree of exibility
in this functional form.
Third, we write trade costs as a function of variables commonly used in gravity equation
estimations
 jns = 4dist
4
jn  5(1 + tjns)5  6e6langjn  7e7coljn  8e8intjn (5)
where distjn denotes the geographical distance between j and n and tjns is the sector-specic
import tari¤ charged by n on imports from j. The binary variables langjn, coljn, and intjn
indicate whether j and n have an o¢ cial language in common, were in a colonial relationship at
some point after 1945 or are part of the same market, respectively. This last term is included in
the specication of  jns since the price index also includes rms from n. As a large body of re-
search shows that border e¤ects are quantitatively important, ignoring them would signicantly
underestimate the trade cost advantage of domestic rms (see McCallum, 1995; Anderson and
van Wincoop, 2003).
With these assumptions, we obtain our empirical measure for the crowdedness of market n
as
P 1 sns = CRns = As
24X
j
ex
1(s 1)
jn 
2
jnuc
3(1 s)
js 
1 s
jns
35 (6)
where As = 8z=1z 

s
s 1
1 s
summarizes constant terms and  jns is dened in (5). While
(6) has been derived from a specic economic model we believe that its intuitive appeal is more
general. For example, we can use CRns to ask what will happen to rm-level exports to market
n if the number of competitors active there goes up (jn up), their unit costs decrease (ucjs
down) or the trade barriers protecting it are lowered ( jns down).
Expression (6) requires estimates for the parameters As and 1(1 s) to 8(1 s). These
can be obtained from estimating gravity equations under the same assumptions which have
been made so far. To see this, rst note that the value of total exports from j to n in sector s
is given by
Rjn =
X
j
Z
ijns
p1 sjn P
s 1
n Endi
Under the assumptions entering the denition of (6), this can be written as (see appendix B.2):
Rjn = Asex
1(s 1)
jn 
2
jnuc
3(1 s)
js 
1 s
jns P
s 1
n En
Using our functional form assumption for nj from (5) and adding a time dimension, we derive
the following gravity equation (in multiplicative form):
7
Rjnst = 0ex
1
jnt
2
jntuc
3
jt 
h
dist
4
jnt(1 + tjnt)
5e6langjnt+7coljnt+8intjnt
i
 dnst  "jnt (7)
where "jnt is an error term and dnst are destination-sector-time xed e¤ects, capturing the term
P s 1nst Enst for which do not have an empirical counterpart yet.
We estimate (7) by Poisson QMLE, following Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006). We use data
on sectoral exports for all countries in our sample in 1992-2003.4 Results are shown in table 1.
Column 1 reports coe¢ cient estimates from a regression pooling the data across industries and
thus estimating a single coe¢ cient for each of the required parameters. Columns 2-4 summarize
estimates of sector-by-sector regressions by displaying the median, minimum and maximum
coe¢ cient estimates along with the corresponding t-statistics.
Table 1: Table 1 about here
Overall, our results are very much in line with previous gravity equation estimates (see
Disdier and Head, 2007). Distance has a signicantly negative inuence on bilateral trade while
sharing a common language or colonial ties or being part of the same market all have a positive
impact. Besides these more traditional determinants, the additional variables suggested by
our model also have the expected sign and are highly statistically signicant. In the pooled
regression, a 1% increase in the exporters unit labour costs reduces exports by around -0.25%
while a 1% increase in the number of exporters is associated with 0.67% more exports.
We use our estimates from (7) to obtain the required parameter values in (6) as As = ^0,
1(1  s) = ^1 etc. Thus,
CRnst = ^0
0@X
j
ex
^1
jnt
^2
jntuc
^3
jt 
h
dist
^4
jnt(1 + tjnt)
^5e^6langjnt+^7coljnt+^8intjnt
i1A (8)
For the main part of the analysis, we calculate (8) using the parameter estimates from the
pooled regression (column 1 of table 1). The reason for this is that these estimates have a much
higher degree of precisision than the sectoral-level estimates (which are often insignicant for
a large fraction of industries - see table 1). Section 4.2 presents results for robustness checks
using the sectoral coe¢ cient estimates.
Other variables Finding proxies for the remaining variables in (2) and (3) is straightforward.
Total expenditure Ens in market n, sector s, is proxied by total absorption, i.e. local production
plus imports minus exports. For sector-specic trade costs between Italy and market n ( ins),
we use a similar assumption to before, i.e.  ins = I3dist
3
in  I4(1 + tins)4 . We have dropped
the indicators for common language and colonial ties since these are almost always equal to zero
4See section 3 for details on our data. We pool data across four three-year periods in the regressions for
comparability with the later rm-level regressions (see section 3). To estimate (7), we need to convert trade ows
into a common currency (U.S. dollars). Accordingly, the relevant exchange rate on the right-hand side is the
exchange rate between exporter js currency and the U.S. dollar.
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(the only other country which has Italian as an o¢ cial language is Switzerland and Italy has
not had colonial ties with any country after 1945). Since we only consider exports, we further
excluded the dummy for intranational trade.
To proxy rm-specic marginal costs ci, we use two approaches. In analogy to our earlier
assumptions, we rst consider the case ci = I2

wi
V Ai
2
= I2 (uci)
2 where wi denotes the
total wagebill of rm i, V Ai is a rms value added and uci its unit labour costs.5 We will also
use rm-by-year xed e¤ects to proxy ci to show that our results do not depend on this specic
assumption about production technologies.
Finally, we require an empirical counterpart for the initial setup costs Fin from equation
(3). Our proxy for Fin should a¤ect the export entry decision but not the value of exports. We
use two di¤erent variables which arguably full this property (see section 3 for details on the
data sources). The rst is a rms distance to Milan. Since Milan is Italys business capital
and learning about export markets happens in large part through contact with other exporting
rms, proximity to Milan should lower Fin. Secondly, we use an indicator for whether a rm
is credit constraint or not. In most industries, the setup costs Fin have to be paid before any
exports can take place and thus cannot be paid out of current export revenues. Since these
initial investments can be considerable, credit is needed to nance them upfront (Roberts and
Tybout, 1997; Manova, 2008).
2.3 Empirical Specications
With these empirical proxies, we arrive at our baseline estimation equation
rint =
(
0ex
1
intuc
2
it dist
3
in (1 + tins)
4E
5
nstCR
6
nst1inst if Dins  0
0 otherwise
(9)
where Dins = 0ex
1
intuc
2
it dist
3
in(1+tins)
4E5nstCR
6
nstF
7
in 2inst. Before turning to the estimation,
we present details on our data sources and some descriptive statistics.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Firm-level data on exports and other rm characteristics come from a survey conducted every
three years by Capitalia on a representative sample of Italian manufacturing rms. In this
paper, we use the four most recent waves of the survey carried out in 1995, 1998, 2001, and
2004, each covering the previous three years with very similar questionnaires. We pool data
across the corresponding three-year periods (1992-1994, 1995-1997, 1998-2000, 2001-2003) since
we only have information on average exports per survey period.
Firms in our sample are always selected for at least two out of the four surveys. However,
only rms rms with more than 500 employees are included in each wave. For smaller rms,
the sample is selected with a stratied design on location, industrial activity and size. The
5As before, a su¢ cient condition for this is that the short-run value added production function (i.e. after set-
up costs are incurred) is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale and the cost of capital is either identical
across rms or proportional to wages or total factor productivity (see before and appendix B.2). Note that most
of our regressions will include industry-by-year xed e¤ects so that the cost of capital can vary across industries.
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time dimension of our panel is thus short (two adjacent three-year periods for most rms) and
we will rely mainly on cross-sectional identication in our analysis. After excluding rms with
missing observations for required data, we obtain a sample of 3,628 rms and 8,084 rm-year
pairs in 1992-2003.
The main data items we use are the value of exports by destination and unit labour costs
(a rms wage bill divided by value added). Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on these and a
few additional variables for the rms in the sample (see appendix A.1 for more details on data
construction). The majority of rms serve both the domestic and foreign markets. In our sample
74% of rms export in at least one period. As expected, exporting rms are larger in terms of
both employment and sales and have lower unit labour costs and higher productivity than non-
exporters. In our data export destinations are grouped by main geographical areas. Excluding
the domestic market we can observe a maximum of 8 foreign destinations.6 However, most rms
serve substantially fewer markets: 20% of rms only export to one foreign market (mostly the
EU15), while less than 2% serve all eight markets. The average number of destinations among
exporters is 2.9.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Non Exporters Exporters Total
Obs Mean Sd Obs Mean Sd Obs Mean Sd
Employment 2256 57.0 174.2 5831 190.0 613.4 8087 155.7 537.5
Sales (Mil Euro) 2256 12.7 79.8 5831 36.2 137.0 8087 30.0 125.0
Labour Prod. (index) 2256 0.93 0.40 5831 1.03 0.41 8087 1 0.41
Unit Lab. Costs (index) 2256 1.02 0.25 5831 0.99 0.24 8087 1 0.24
Export Share (%) 2256 0 0 5831 0.39 0.29 8087 0.28 0.30
N. of dest.out of 8 2256 0 0 5831 2.89 1.90 8087 2.13 2.07
Family Firms (share) 2255 0.87 0.34 5829 0.80 0.40 8084 0.82 0.38
N. of workers in R&D 2243 2.0 4.2 5771 5.2 6.0 8014 4.3 5.7
Multinationals (share) 2256 0.05 0.21 5822 0.28 0.45 8078 0.21 0.41
The country-level data required for the calculation of our competition measure come from
a number of sources. Sectoral-level information on value added, the total wage bill and the
number of establishments are taken from UNIDOs Industrial Statistics Database. Bilateral
exchange rates are from the IMFs International Financial Statistics. The trade data we use for
estimating the models parameters are provided by CEPII (2005) which uses UN Comtrade as
its main source but performs a number of additional data cleaning exercises. Data on bilateral
tari¤s, distances, common o¢ cial languages and colonial links is also from CEPII (2005, 2006).
6These are Europe (EU15 excluding Italy), other European countries (including Russia and Turkey), NAFTA
(United States, Canada and Mexico), Central and South American countries, China, other Asian countries
(excluding China), Africa, and Australia and Oceania.
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The number of countries common to these datasets is 144. Missing data force us to discard
additional countries, leaving us with a sample of 77 countries for 1992-2003 (see appendix A.2
for a list of countries).
We calculate our measure of market crowding using absorption-weighted averages for the
bilateral variables in (8). For example, the distance between the United Kingdom (j) and
NAFTA (n) is distjn =
P
mn distjm  sharemn, where sharemn is the share of country m in
total absorption of NAFTA and n = fUSA, Canada, Mexicog. We use the same approach for
obtaining bilateral distances and tari¤s for Italian rm-level exports in (9).7
Table 3 displays information on the crowdedness of the eight export destinations in terms of
our measure CRnst. We compute a ranking (1.-8.) of these destinations for each industry and
period in our data.8 The percentage gures indicate in how many industry-period combinations
a particular market was the most crowded, second most crowded etc. For example, the entries
for NAFTA indicate that in 25% of industry-period combinations, this market scored highest
on our CR measure. The markets of the EU15 and Asia ex. China are more crowded, with
the EU15 and Asia ex China coming rst in 33% and 37%, respectively. The markets of
Australia-Oceania and especially Africa are much less crowded and appear in last place for
most cases. The remaining markets (China, Central and South America and Europe ex. EU15)
are intermediately crowded and represent the largest fractions of the 4th-6th place entries.
Table 3: Ranking of Markets by Degree of Crowdedness
Ranking, Crowdedness (1992-2003)
Export Market 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
Africa 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 9% 89% 100%
Asia ex. China 37% 24% 36% 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Australia-Oceania 0% 0% 0% 0% 6% 39% 46% 9% 100%
CS-America 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 54% 43% 0% 100%
China 5% 13% 19% 30% 25% 6% 2% 2% 100%
EU15 (ex. Italy) 33% 25% 19% 23% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
Europe other 0% 0% 5% 29% 66% 0% 0% 0% 100%
NAFTA 25% 38% 22% 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
7We use total rather than sectoral absorption and compute shares for 1989-1991 to reduce endogeneity prob-
lems.
8See appendix A for a description of our industry classication.
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4 Econometric Results
4.1 Baseline Specication
We start by estimating a Heckman selection model based on a log-linearized version of equation
(9).9 Column 1 of table 4 presents results without exclusion restrictions (i.e. assuming that
7 = 0). Identication thus relies on the nonlinearity of the inverse Mills ratio (Wooldridge,
2002). Column 2 uses as exclusion restriction a proxy for whether a rm is credit constraint
and would thus nd it more di¢ cult to nance the initial setup costs (see appendix A.1 for
details on this variable). Column 3 proxies the setup costs of exporting Fin by distance of the
exporter to Milan.
As shown in table 4 the results are not very sensitive to the choice of exclusion restriction.
In all cases, foreign absorption enters signicantly with a positive contribution while market
crowding, distance to the export market and rm-level unit labour costs show the expected
negative sign. Looking at the selection equations, a similar pattern holds for the decision to
export to a specic market. Higher absorption and lower unit labour costs raise the probability
that a rm is active on market n, while distance and stronger market crowding reduce it. Note
that the excluded variables (distance to Milan, dummy for credit constraints) are also signicant
and have the expected sign - both lowering the probability of export market entry.
To get an impression of the overall impact of the regressors, we also report marginal e¤ects
evaluated at the sample mean. As seen, the combined e¤ect of a 1% increase in the level of
crowdedness of a foreign market is a -0.27% to -0.28% decrease in rm-level exports there. For
foreign absorption, a 1% increase leads to an increase in exports of 0.53% to 0.54%. Marginal
e¤ects for a 1% increase in the other variables are +0.66% to +0.67% for exchange rates, -3.10%
to -3.30% for tari¤s, -0.72% to -0.74% for bilateral distance and -0.31% to -0.36% for unit labour
costs.
< Table 4 about here >
4.2 Robustness Checks
Table 5 reports a number of robustness checks on our initial results.10 Columns 1 and 2 control
for conditions on other markets. Column one includes an absorption-weighted average of the
competition on all eight foreign markets,
CRRoW;st =
X
n
sharens  CRnst
where sharens is the average share of market n in the overall absorption of industry s over
the period 1992-2003. Column 2 includes market crowding in Italy itself, calculated in the
9We thus assume that (1inst, 2inst)  N(0;) where  =

1 1
1 
2
1

.
10Since table 4 suggests that results are robust to the absence of exclusion restrictions, we report results for
Heckit estimations without such restrictions. This maximises the number of available observations and ensure
comparability with alternative estimation techniques reported below. To save space, we also only report marginal
e¤ects from now. Full results are available from the authors upon request.
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same way as CRnst for all other markets. In both specications, we also add total industry
absorption in Italy and the rest of the world, respectively, as an additional control. As the
results show, the sign of these variables is mostly as expected. Higher demand in Italy or the
rest of the world reduces exports to any given market. Lower levels of market crowding in Italy
also impact exports negatively. The sign on market crowding in the rest of the world (CRRoW;st)
is counterintuitively negative but the coe¢ cient is small and statistically insignicant. In both
specications, foreign market crowding remains statistically and economically signicant.
< Table 5 about here >
Columns 3 and 4 report results with di¤erent sets of xed e¤ects. Column 3 adds destination-
year xed e¤ects and column 4 uses industry-year specic e¤ects. Using destination-year xed
e¤ects reduces the magnitude of the destination-specic regressors while using industryyear
xed e¤ect has the opposite impact. A possible explanation is that the cross-destination varia-
tion in our regressors is more important than the cross-industry variation and that measurement
error thus tends to bias results more strongly towards zero in the destination-year xed e¤ects
specication. In both cases, however, all regressors retain their sign and signicance, indicating
that the earlier results are not relying on a single dimension of the data only. Note that the use
of industry-year xed e¤ects also controls for the inuence of alternative export markets which
were found to be important above. We use this set of xed e¤ects for most of our remaining
empirical results.11
In column 5, we recalculate our measure of market crowding using the sector-specic esti-
mates from table 1. While estimation precision is much lower, they are closer to the theoretical
model from section 1. This is because elasticities of substitution s are likely to vary across
sectors which in turn will inuence the degree of market crowding. As shown, the qualitative
picture of the previous regressions stays intact when allowing for this additional variation.
Columns 6-9 report results for two alternative estimation techniques. Columns 6-7 show
results obtained via the QML Poisson estimator proposed by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
for gravity equation estimations. This estimation method does not allow to disentangle the
extensive and intensive margin of export decisions suggested by the model. However, it has
the advantage over the previous Heckit estimates of not imposing distributional assumptions
on the error structure - a correct specication of the conditional mean is su¢ cient to obtain
consistent estimates. Poisson further allows estimation of results with rm-by-year xed e¤ects
since (unlike Heckit) it is not susceptible to incidental parameter problems (Wooldridge, 2002).
Columns 8-9 nally present OLS estimates for comparison with much of the earlier literature
on gravity equation estimations.
A comparison with the marginal e¤ects reported in column 4 reveals that the impact of
competition is around 50% lower with OLS although still highly statistically signicant. The
remaining coe¢ cient estimates are broadly in line with the comparable Heckit marginal e¤ects.
11As said, using industry-by-year xed e¤ects implies that identication relies on cross-destination variation in
the data. In our view, this is also closer to the theoretical framework from section 2 which models rm-export
decisions to di¤erent destinations within a given industry. All qualitative results in the remainder of the paper
carry through under alternative sets of xed e¤ects (year or destination-year).
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Adding rm-by-year xed e¤ects (column 9) leaves the coe¢ cient on CR and the other regressors
almost unchanged. For Poisson QMLE, coe¢ cient estimates of destination-specic variables are
generally slightly larger in magnitude than with Heckit and OLS, with the exception of tari¤s
(whose coe¢ cient is halved). Overall, however, the qualitative picture of the earlier results
remains very much intact.
4.3 Alternative Measures of Export Market Competition
We also present results for two non-theory based measures of export market crowding. First,
we use the average trade-weighted import tari¤ of market n:
AvgTarnst =
X
j
(sharejns  tariffnjst)
where tariffnjst is the average tari¤ imposed in market n on imports from country j. These
tari¤s are weighted by the average import share of country j on market n over the entire period
1992-2003 (sharejns).
Secondly, we construct a measure based on the Herndahl index for market n, sector s.
We do not have data on the market shares of individual rms. Instead, we assume that total
exports from j to n are equally split among exporters in j. Thus,
Herfnst =
X
j
njst

sharenjst
njst
2
where sharejnst is the share of country j in total absorption of market n, sector s, period t.
We continue to proxy the number of exporters (njst) as described in section 2.2. If exports
from j to n are equally distributed among exporters, each exporter will have a market share
of sharenjst=njst. Squaring this share, multiplying by njst and summing over all countries
exporting to n then yields the Herndahl index for the respective market and industry.
< Table 6 about here >
Table 6 present the results for these two alternative measures. The tari¤ variable AvgTarnst
is signicant and has the expected sign in column 1. Ceteris paribus, higher average destination
market tari¤s should increase exports since foreign competitors will nd access to that market
more di¢ cult (controlling for the tari¤s faced by Italian exporters themselves). However, this
result is not robust to the inclusion of industry xed e¤ects in column 2 - the coe¢ cient on
AvgTar actually becomes negative although statistically insignicantly so. A similar picture
emerges for the Herndahl index. It has the expected positive sign in column 3. More con-
centrated and thus presumable less competitive markets attract more Italian exports, ceteris
paribus. But again, controlling for industry-year xed e¤ects overturns this result.
4.4 Firm Heterogeneity
There are several apriori reasons why one might expect the e¤ect of market crowding to vary
across rms. This section investigates this issue further. First, one might expect vertically
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di¤erentiated rms to be less a¤ected by the degree of crowdedness of a foreign market. In
essence, higher product quality will increase the degree of di¤erentiation with other products
and reduce the impact of competition from other exporters and local rms.
Secondly, rms are likely to be less a¤ected by foreign market conditions if they belong to
international networks within multinational entreprises. For example, they might sell goods
abroad using di¤erent distribution channels or sell to other rms within the same group. Over-
coming initial sunk costs associated with exporting might also be easier for such rms and less
inuenced foreign market crowding.
Finally, an interesting source of potential heterogeneity comes from the type of ownership.
In Italy, a substantial share of rms (of any size) are owned and managed by families. Barba
Navaretti, Faini and Tucci (2007) show how such rms tend to export less and to less distant
markets than publicly owned rms.
Table 7 presents results for regressions allowing for heterogeneity by interacting proxies for
the above groups of rms with foreign market crowding. We classify a rm as being vertically
di¤erentiated if it engages in R&D activity (i.e. employs workers in R&D). "Multinational com-
panies" are rms that are either foreign owned or have a¢ liates abroad themselves. "Family
rms" are rms that are managed by the owner or some member of its family. Table 2 con-
tains summary statistics on these variables and appendix A provides further details on their
construction.12
< Table 7 about here >
Columns 1 to 3 introduce these characteristics one by one. We see how rms engaging in R&D
tend to be less a¤ected by the crowdeness on the foreign markets both in the intensive and
in the extensive margin. A similar e¤ect is present for non-family owned rms, although only
for the intensive margin. For MNEs results are less conclusive. Both the export market entry
decision and overall exports are less inuenced by market crowding for rms which are part
of MNEs. However, the coe¢ cient estimates are small in magnitude and only very marginally
statistically signicant.
In Column 4, we include all three characteristics and their interactions with the CR variable
in the same specication. As before, the marginal e¤ects of the interaction terms are all positive
albeit only statistically signicant for R&D. Note that the rm characteristics which we interact
with CR are not mutually exclusive. Our results thus indicate that the rms most a¤ected by
foreign market crowding are domestic family rms that are not part of multinationals and do
not employ R&D workers. On the other end of the range are multinationals not managed by
a family and employing workers in R&D. According to our results, the overall average impact
of foreign market crowding is around 10% less important for this latter group than for the
former. This di¤erence is statistically signicant although economically not very large - market
crowding clearly matters for all types of rms.
12Note that we code the family-rm dummy as 0 for family rms and 1 for other rms.
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5 Quantitative Importance of Results
We now turn to an evaluation of the quantitative importance of our results. We do so by
performing a series of counterfactual experiments. That is, we set various elements of the right-
hand side of (9) to new counterfactual values, compute new predicted exports and compare
them to their original value.
Specically, let rint = E(rintjXint)"int denote the original value of exports and r^int =
E(rintjX^int)"int the exports under the counterfactual values of the regressors X. The per-
centage change in exports across all rms between the counterfactual and the actual scenario is
then
R^it  Rit
Rit
=
IX
i=1
NX
n=1
sitsint
E(rintjX^int)  E(rintjXint)
E(rintjXint)
where sit and sint are, respectively, the share of rm i in total actual exports (Rit) and market
ns share in rm is actual exports (rit). Note that we require values for E(rintj:) rather than
E(ln rintj:) for these calculations. For our Heckit estimates, the expected value of rint in levels
is given by (see Dow and Norton, 2003):
E(rintjX) = 
 
X1^sel + ^"^"

exp
 
X2^out + 0:5^
2
"

where ^" is the estimated variance of the outcome equations error term and ^" the estimated
coe¢ cient of correlation between outcome and selection residuals. X1 and X2 denote the vari-
ables in the selection and outcome equation, respectively, and ^sel and ^out are the corresponding
coe¢ cient estimates. For OLS, Mullahy (1998) shows that
E(rintjX) = X^OLS + 0:5^OLS
where ^OLS is the vector of OLS coe¢ cient estimates corresponding to X and ^OLS is the
estimated variance of the OLS residual.13 Note that the Poisson regressions directly give us
E(rintjX) so that no transformation is necessary.
We start our counterfactuals by setting the various regressors X = fex, uc, t, E, CRg on
the right-hand side of (9) to their values lagged by one period. We do so separately for each of
the regressors. This allows us to calculate the growth rate of total exports in the absence of,
for example, demand growth (E^nst = Enst 1), changes in exchange rates (ex^nt = exnt 1), or
unit labour costs (uc^it = ucit 1). Table 8 shows results for all regressors except distance which
is time-invariant. We report geometric averages of growth rates across periods, expressed in
%-changes per year. These gures thus tell us by how much more or less Italian exports would
have grown per year in the absence of any changes in, say, absorption or unit labour cost over
the sample period 1992-2003.14
13This result requires homoskedasticity and normality of the OLS residual. Similarly, for the above Heckit
transformation we require joint normality and heteroskedasticity of the error terms in outcome and selection
equation (this is of course already required for consistency of our earlier Heckit estimates so that no new assump-
tions are needed here).
14The reason for taking this approach is that we do not observe all rms in all periods or even in the rst and
last period. Otherwise, we could have simply set regressors in 2001-2003 to their 1992-1994 value and computed
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We should note that these counterfactuals are not general equilibrium in nature. For exam-
ple, lower demand growth is likely to result in a reduction in the number of foreign competitors
active on Italian export markets. It might also result in lower world-wide demand for manufac-
turing inputs and thus lower unit labour costs of Italian producers.
With these caveats in mind, we turn to a discussion of the results from table 8. The Heckit
estimates allow us to analyse the e¤ect of the above counterfactual changes on the probability
of selection into exporters status (the extensive margin) and the value of exports taking the
probability of selection as given (the intensive margin). We thus report three counterfactual
growth rates of exports. First, we only use counterfactual values of the regressors X1 in the
outcome equation (the intensive margin, column 1). Next, we only set the regressors in the
selection equation, X2, to their new values (the extensive margin, column 2). Finally, we
change both X1 and X2 which gives us the total e¤ect of the counterfactual change.
According to the counterfactuals based on our Heckit estimates, absorption is by far the
most important determinant of export growth. Keeping absorption constant would have reduced
exports by around -4% per year or by 42% over the sample period. Not unexpectedly, the biggest
contribution to this overall gure comes from the EU15 (excluding Italy). Holding absorption
growth there constant would have meant -1.3% less exports/year. The second and third most
important markets with regards to demand growth were other European countries (-0.9%/year)
and NAFTA (-0.2%/year).
Exchange rate variations and changes in unit labour costs were also important. Holding
unit labour costs xed would have allowed Italian exports to grow by around 1.4%/year more
rapidly. Keeping exchange rates unchanged would have increased Italian exports by 2% per
year. This relatively large gure seems to be mainly due to the large scale devaluations of big
South American importers (Brazil, Argentina) over the sample period. This is evident from the
next two lines where we disaggregate results by allowing South and Central American exchange
rates to vary but holding all other exchange rate xed - as well as the other way around.
Turning to the remaining regressors, the roles of tari¤s and market crowding are less signif-
icant. In the absence of any further tari¤ reductions after 1992, Italian export growth would
have been -0.3% per year lower. The impact of freezing the level of market crowding is actually
the smallest among all regressors. Holding it constant would have increased exports by only
around -0.2% per year or around 1.5% over the entire sample period.
The same qualitative picture reappears when looking across estimation techniques. OLS
results are mostly very similar to Heckit, with the exception of unit labour costs which are less
important now (0.5% per year). Poisson implies a somewhat stronger impact of market crowding
(0.35% per year or 3.2% over the sample period) but most of the other factors also become more
important. For example, an absence of demand growth now would have reduced exports by -
5.3% per year or almost 60% over the sample period. Thus, changes in market crowding were
an order of magnitude less important than changes in foreign demand conditions.
Of course, these aggregate gures might hide substantial variation across the components of
CR which could cancel each other out. We thus also report the impact of the various components
of CR - number of exporters, foreign tari¤, exchange rates and unit labour costs. That is, for
counterfactual yearly growth rates.
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each one of these components we recompute our market crowding measure while only holding
this particular variable constant over time. As the results indicate, the impact of changes in
the number of exporters, foreign tari¤s and unit labour costs all worked in the same direction
- each contributed towards a (small) reduction in Italian exports.
Another possibility of decomposing the impact of market crowding is to look at the role of
individual countries. We do so by returning to one of the motivating questions for this paper
and ask whether Italian exports would have grown faster or more slowly in the absence of
Chinas intergration into the world economy. To this end, we rst x the contribution of China
to our CR measure, i.e. we freeze the number of Chinese exporters, unit labour costs, and the
exchange rates and tari¤s they face. Since CR is a sum over all countries in our sample, Chinas
impact could in principle be bigger than the aggregate gure of -0.2% per year presented above.
Secondly, we do the same with Chinas absorption growth and its external tari¤s and exchange
rate facing Italy. As the results in table 9 indicate, the role of China is not very important in our
sample period and if anything positive. Chinas integration into the world economy meant more
competition for Italian exporters but this e¤ect is neglibible (0.02% per year). Furthermore, it
is dominated by increased exporting opportunities to the large Chinese market. An absence of
absorption growth in China would have lowered Italian exports by -0.13% per year and freezing
tari¤s at their 1992 level would have contributed another -0.09% per year. Overall, we estimate
that in the absence of changes in China and its integration into the world trading system, Italian
exports would have grown by -0.2% per year less quickly.
As a nal counterfactual, we ask what Italian exports would have been had absorption
growth in the EU15 had been as rapid in the rest of the world - i.e. on average 1.5% per year
higher than it has been. As the last row in table 9 shows, the slow growth in demand in Italys
main market is an order of magnitude more important than the emergence of China. Bringing
EU15 demand growth up to the world average would have increased Italian exports by up to
0.8% per year.
6 Conclusions
This paper examined the role of foreign market conditions for rm-level exports. Given the
growing share of exports in manufacturing production it is of key interest for both academic
and economic policy debates to obtain a better understanding of how levels of demand and
competition intensity of foreign markets a¤ect export performance.
We started by constructing a simple rm-level gravity model to derive an econometric speci-
cation linking destination-specic exports to rm characteristics, foreign demand and the degree
of competitiveness or crowdednessof foreign markets. This latter variable is a measure of the
e¢ ciency of rms competing in a given market and the barriers impeding their access, such as
tari¤s or physical distance. We estimated this specication on a large sample of Italian manu-
facturing rms in 1992-2003. Having shown that market crowding has a robust negative impact
on rm-level exports across a wide range of specications, we used our estimates to evaluate the
quantitative importance of market crowding. Our main specication indicates that increased
numbers and e¢ ciency of foreign rms combined with better overall accessibility of destination
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markets have reduced Italian exports by around 0.2% per year or 1.5% over the sample period.
This is similar to the e¤ects of tari¤ reductions for Italian rms (+0.3% per year) but smaller
than the impact of higher unit labour costs (-1.4% per year) and less favourable exchange rates
(-2.0% per year). By far the most important determinant of export performance was foreign
demand growth, however, raising Italian exports by up to 5.3% per year or almost 60% over
the sample period. Our results also indicate that the role of China in explaining Italian export
performance is small and if anything positive. Stronger competition from China marginally
lowered Italian exports but this was overcompensated by Chinese demand growth and tari¤
reductions, yielding an overall positive e¤ect on export growth of 0.2% per year. Much more
important was the fact that demand on Italys main export market, the EU15, has grown more
slowly over 1992-2003 than in the rest of the world. Bringing demand growth in the EU15 up
to the world average would have increased Italian exports by 0.8% per year.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Firm-Level Variables
Exports: For each rm the dataset provides information on the share of output exported and on
the destination of these export sales. Export destinations are grouped into 8 major geographical
areas: Europe (EU15 excluding Italy), other European countries (including Russia and Turkey),
NAFTA countries (United States, Canada and Mexico), Central and South American countries,
China, other Asian countries (excluding China), Africa, and Australia and Oceania. Therefore,
knowing the total output (sales) we construct the values of sales to each area and use this as
dependent variable for our export equations.
Unit Labour Costs: We obtain a measure of unit labour costs by dividing the total wage
bill by a rms value added. Note that this is equivalent to dividing averages wages by labour
productivity.
Credit Constraints: The questionnaire includes information on the rmsaccess to credit.
For our credit constraints dummy, we use a rms answer (yes/no) to the question: "Did you
ask your bank for more credit without obtaining it?".
R&D : Dummy equal to 1 when the rm has employees in Research and Development.
Family : Dummy equal to 0 when the rm is managed by the owner or some member of its
family (note the inverse coding).
Multinational : Dummy equal to 1 if the rm has a share of foreign ownership greater than
zero and/or the rm is part of an industrial group that has a¢ liates abroad and/or the rm
has invested abroad in the period observed.
A.2 Industry classication
The industrial activity of each rm in the Capitalia dataset is described by a four-digit NACE
Rev. 1 code. The market crowding and absorption measures are calculated from data reported
at the three-digit level of ISIC Rev. 2 which we map into NACE using o¢ cial correspondences.
ISIC three-digit is less detailed than NACE four-digit which implies that rms in di¤erent NACE
sectors may have identical values for absorption or crowdedness. All standard errors reported in
this paper are thus clustered at the more aggregated ISIC-level. Industry xed e¤ects are also
at the ISIC-level in order to properly control for industry variation in our destination-specic
variables (we have also experimented with using three-digit or four-digit NACE dummies but
results were very similar).
A.3 List of Countries used for Calculation of Competition Measure
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile,
China, Côte dIvoire, Cameroon, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Al-
geria, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong,
Honduras, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Japan,
Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Moldova, Mexico, Macedonia, Mauritius, Malawi,
Malaysia, Nigeria, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Ro-
mania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thai-
land, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, Uruguay, United States of Amer-
ica, Venezuela, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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B Derivations of Propositions
B.1 Proxying Marginal by Unit Labour Cost - Su¢ cient Conditions
Assuming that value-added production functions are Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to
scale allows us to rewrite the weighted sum of marginal cost from section 2 as
n 1jns
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c1 sijns;LCUj di = n
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
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where ijs is total factor productivity of rm i in sector s, country j, and wjs and ijs are the
wage rate and cost of capital it faces. We further assume that all rms within a given sector
and country have the same level of total factor productivity, ijs = js and that the costs of
capital are equalized across countries and sectors, e.g. because capital is freely mobile.15 Thus,
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Under the same assumptions, it also holds that ijs = xijs

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where xijs is value
added of rm i and l and k are labour and capital used by the rm. Solving for labour and
capital demand given factor prices wjs and ijs, this simplies to ijs = js =

i
wjs
1 1 xjs
ljs
.
Thus,
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. Collecting results we obtain:
n 1jn
Z
ijns
c1 sijns;LCUj di =

wjsljs
xjs
1 s
where wjsljsxjs are the unit labour costs of country j, sector s (sectoral wage bill divided by value
added).
B.2 Derivation of the Gravity Equation
We start from the expression for total sectoral exports from j to n, Rjns =
P
j
R
ijns
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s 1
ns Ensdi.
With prices set under monopolistic competition as before, this becomes
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With the same empirical proxies for 1 sjns , e
s 1
jn , njns, and (n
 1
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R
ijns
c1 sijns di) outlined in
section 2.2, this can be written as:
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.
15Assuming that the costs of capital are proportional to the wage rate or TFP yields the same results.
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Table 1: Estimation of Parameters — Gravity Equation 
  Dep. Var. Bilateral Exports 
 
Specification Pooled Sector-specific 
   Min Median Max 
 
ln(exchange rate) 
0.053 
(6.19)** 
-0.030 
(0.03) 
0.041 
(0.77) 
0.144 
(4.28)** 
 
ln(establishments_exporters) 
0.669 
(48.72)** 
0.347 
(5.47)** 
0.665 
(8.75)** 
0.889 
(12.36)** 
 
ln(unitcost_exporter) 
-0.251 
(8.00)** 
-1.119 
(5.76)** 
-0.303 
(1.80)+ 
0.000 
(0.00) 
 
ln(distance) 
-0.222 
(6.57)** 
-0.680 
(3.83)** 
-0.318 
(1.96)* 
0.173 
(1.39) 
 
ln(1+tariff) 
-1.202 
(1.85.)+ 
-7.843 
(3.68)** 
-0.584 
(0.16) 
8.201 
(1.52) 
 
Common language 
0.554 
(5.90)** 
0.041 
(0.08) 
0.572 
(2.01)* 
1.234 
(3.89)** 
 
Colonial ties after 1945 
1.199 
(20.26)** 
0.517 
(0.64) 
1.234 
(4.44)** 
2.307 
(5.20)** 
 
Internal trade flow dummy 
0.234 
(3.84)** 
-0.462 
(1.00) 
0.590 
(2.09)* 
1.918 
(6.05)** 
 
     
 
Fixed Effects 
Importer-
Industry-Year 
Importer-
Year 
Importer-
Year 
Importer-
Year 
 
Observations 73476 2538 2736 2772 
Notes: Table displays coefficients and t-statistics for Poisson QMLE (based on standard errors 
clustered on exporter-importer-industry pairs in column 1 and exporter-importer pairs in columns 2-4). 
Column one pools all sectors while columns 2-4 present results for sector specific regressions. For each 
regressor, we display the minimum, median and maximum coefficient estimate across regressions, as 
well as the minimum, median and maximum number of observations (estimates and number of 
observations in a given column can thus come from different regressions). * and ** signify statistical 
significance at the 5% and 1% levels 
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Table 4: Baseline Results - Heckman 
  1) 2) 3) 
  ln(exp) d(exp>0) ME ln(exp) d(exp>0) ME ln(exp) d(exp>0) ME 
           
 ln(CR) -0.253 -0.125 -0.277 -0.190 -0.127 -0.266 -0.242 -0.118 -0.264 
  (4.75)** (5.45)** (5.88)** (3.67)** (5.40)** (5.59)** (4.59)** (5.12)** (5.57)** 
 ln(ex. rate) 0.643 0.299 0.672 0.584 0.302 0.664 0.629 0.294 0.662 
  (14.21)** (13.27)** (14.12)** (12.66)** (13.17)** (13.98)** (13.69)** (12.96)** (13.89)**
 ln(absorption) 0.514 0.239 0.537 0.455 0.240 0.526 0.499 0.234 0.525 
  (14.02)** (15.11)** (16.36)** (11.97)** (14.83)** (15.92)** (13.43)** (14.64)** (15.96)**
 ln(1+tariff) -2.378 -1.589 -3.323 -2.000 -1.603 -3.269 -2.186 -1.506 -3.141 
  (5.54)** (7.68)** (7.89)** (4.79)** (7.46)** (7.63)** (5.21)** (7.27)** (7.48)** 
 ln(distance) -0.556 -0.345 -0.731 -0.493 -0.347 -0.721 -0.544 -0.348 -0.735 
  (14.86)** (20.88)** (20.54)** (12.09)** (20.73)** (20.46)** (13.70)** (20.99)** (20.68)**
 ln(unitcost) -0.767 -0.086 -0.333 -0.751 -0.073 -0.305 -0.791 -0.096 -0.355 
  (13.83)** (3.88)** (7.30)** (14.06)** (3.19)** (6.59)** (13.97)** (4.26)** (7.73)** 
 Travel time to Milan        -0.033 -0.057 
         (8.67)** (8.43)** 
 Credit constraint dummy     -0.092 -0.157    
      (4.85)** (4.80)**    
     
 Fixed effects Year Year Year 
 Observations 64256 61592 62312 
Notes: Table displays coefficients and t-statistics for Heckman selection models (based on standard errors clustered on industry-destination-years). 
The three columns display results for outcome and selection equation and marginal effects evaluated at sample means, respectively. * and ** 
signify statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 5: Robustness Checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  
  ME ME ME ME ME ME ME ME ME  
            
 ln(CR) -0.289 -0.741 -0.198 -0.605 -0.348 -0.767 -0.769 -0.384 -0.387  
  (4.11)** (9.71)** (3.62)** (10.83)** (8.34)* (4.60)** (5.04)** (6.71)** (6.31)**  
 ln(ex. rate) 0.783 0.937 0.304 0.866 0.749 1.005 1.006 0.832 0.833  
  (12.75)** (15.94)** (2.90)** (21.02)** (20.33)** (11.30)** (12.35)** (16.44)** (15.44)**  
 ln(absorption) 0.647 0.829 0.313 0.752 0.623 0.947 0.948 0.628 0.629  
  (12.31)** (16.59)** (7.47)** (20.84)** 19.98)** (9.68)** (10.83)** (15.35)** (14.41)**  
 ln(1+tariff) -3.058 -3.557 -1.433 -3.842 -3.973 -2.139 -2.149 -3.534 -3.540  
  (8.25)** (8.69)** (3.27)** (12.17)** (11.25)** (3.19)** (3.59)** (11.40)** (10.71)**  
 ln(distance) -0.731 -0.753  -0.736 -0.714 -0.751 -0.751 -0.819 -0.819  
  (21.76)** (21.32)**  (34.39)** (33.34)** (16.50)** (17.34)** (27.29)** (25.61)**  
 ln(unitcost) -0.355 -0.375 -0.338 -0.660 -0.661 -0.811  -0.653   
  (8.02)** (8.28)** (7.44)** (16.27)** (16.26)** (7.15)**  (15.18)**   
 ln(absorb_Italy)  -0.462         
   (7.23)**         
 ln(CR_Italy)  0.573         
   (8.45)**         
 ln(absorb_RoW) -0.244          
  (7.35)**          
 ln(CR_RoW) -0.041          
  (0.78)          
            
 
Fixed effects Year Year 
Destin.-
Year 
Industry-
Year 
Industry-
Year 
Industry-
Year 
Firm-Year
Industry-
Year 
Firm-Year 
 
 Estimation Method Heckit Heckit Heckit Heckit Heckit Poisson Poisson OLS OLS  
 Observations 64256 64256 64256 64256 64256 64256 64256 64256 64256  
Notes: Table displays coefficients and t-statistics based on standard errors clustered on industry-destination-years. Estimation methods are Heckit (columns 1-
5), Poisson (columns 6-7) and OLS (columns 8-9). For Heckit, we report marginal effects evaluated at sample means. * and ** signify statistical significance at 
the 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 6: Non-Theory-Based Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ME ME ME ME 
      
 ln(AvgTariff) 0.172 -0.012   
  (4.68)** (0.51)   
 ln(Herfindahl)   0.032 -0.046 
    (2.25)* (1.98)* 
 ln(exchange rate) 0.679 0.543 0.593 0.482 
  (11.87)** (14.42)** (12.37)** (10.25)** 
 ln(absorption) 0.445 0.402 0.446 0.326 
  (15.07)** (20.60)** (13.55)** (7.38)** 
 ln(1+tariff) -4.298 -3.407 -3.114 -3.438 
  (8.34)** (9.45)** (7.15)** (9.81)** 
 ln(distance) -0.699 -0.697 -0.717 -0.688 
  (18.22)** (31.28) (19.89)** (28.38)** 
 ln(unitcost) -0.388 -0.663 -0.373 -0.662 
  (8.61)** (16.18)** (8.22)** (15.68)** 
      
 Fixed effects Year Industry-Year Year Industry-Year 
 Estimation Method Heckit Heckit Heckit Heckit 
 Observations 64256 64256 64256 64256 
Notes: Table displays coefficients and t-statistics for marginal effects obtained via Heckit (t-statistics based on 
standard errors clustered on industry-destination-years). Marginal effects are evaluated at sample means. +, * and 
** signify statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 7. Firm Heterogeneity 
 
 
(1a) 
ln(exp)  
(1b) 
d(exp>0) 
(1c) 
ME 
(2a) 
ln(exp)  
(2b) 
d(exp>0)
(2c) 
ME 
(3a) 
ln(exp)  
(3b) 
d(exp>0)
(3c) 
ME 
(4a) 
ln(exp)  
(4b) 
d(exp>0) 
(4c) 
ME 
Ln(CR) 
-0.331 
(5.27)** 
-0.355 
(11.63)** 
-0.653 
(11.68)**
-0.285 
(4.62)** 
-0.323 
(10.76)**
-0.610 
(10.72)**
-0.266 
(4.27)** 
-0.344 
(11.09)**
-0.612 
(10.89)**
-0.311 
(5.09)** 
-0.370 
(11.52)** 
-0.654 
(11.60)** 
Ln(exchange 
rate) 
0.696 
(15.23)** 
0.441 
(19.74)** 
0.869 
(21.23)**
0.662 
(14.47)**
0.426 
(19.64)**
0.867 
(21.05)**
0.678 
(15.47)**
0.442 
(19.63)**
0.857 
(20.96)**
0.674 
(16.14)**
0.453 
(19.67)** 
0.860 
(21.17)** 
Ln(absorption) 
0.561 
(12.88)** 
0.387 
(19.57)** 
0.753 
(21.01)**
0.528 
(12.15)**
0.375 
(19.58)**
0.752 
(20.87)**
0.544 
(12.98)**
0.389 
(19.59)**
0.745 
(20.82)**
0.537 
(13.35)**
0.399 
(19.53)** 
0.745 
(20.97)** 
Ln(1+tariff) 
-1.578 
(4.97)** 
-2.118 
(12.53)** 
-3.805 
(12.16)**
-1.494 
(4.71)** 
-2.075 
(12.50)**
-3.843 
(12.12)**
-1.504 
(4.76)** 
-2.138 
(12.36)**
-3.775 
(11.93)**
-1.396 
(4.53)** 
-2.175 
(12.36)** 
-3.752 
(11.94)** 
Ln(distance) 
-0.503 
(15.59)** 
-0.384 
(34.15)** 
-0.736 
(34.05)**
-0.472 
(14.59)**
-0.374 
(34.25)**
-0.736 
(34.26)**
-0.496 
(16.80)**
-0.387 
(34.28)**
-0.729 
(34.03)**
-0.486 
(17.58)**
-0.395 
(34.06)** 
-0.729 
(33.90)** 
Ln(unit costs) 
-0.908 
(16.69)** 
-0.227 
(10.43)** 
-0.565 
(14.44)**
-0.984 
(17.49)**
-0.264 
(12.09)**
-0.662 
(16.33)**
-0.939 
(17.73)**
-0.243 
(11.07)**
-0.591 
(15.26)**
-0.871 
(17.20)**
-0.216 
(9.93)** 
-0.524 
(13.99)** 
Ln(CR)*R&D  
0.024 
(1.75)* 
0.018 
(3.25)** 
0.035 
(3.34)** 
      0.018 
(1.34) 
0.016 
(2.76)** 
0.029 
(2.81)** 
R&D  
0.256 
(2.71)** 
0.081 
(2.19)* 
0.187 
(2.70)** 
      0.222 
(2.40)* 
0.066 
(1.69) 
0.149 
(2.15)* 
Ln(CR)*non-
family   
 0.095 
(2.45)* 
0.002 
(0.06) 
0.022 
(0.63) 
   0.069 
(1.78)* 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.015 
(0.44) 
Non-family 
dummy   
 0.188 
(0.69) 
0.145 
(1.15) 
0.299 
(1.15) 
   0.179 
(0.67) 
0.068 
(0.54) 
0.149 
(0.63) 
Ln(CR)*MNC 
  
    -0.002 
(0.07) 
0.023 
(1.49) 
0.037 
(1.34) 
-0.001 
(0.03) 
0.016 
(1.00) 
0.026 
(0.92) 
MNC dummy 
  
    1.361 
(6.03)** 
0.515 
(4.98)** 
1.317 
(5.36)** 
1.118 
(4.99)** 
0.478 
(4.45)** 
1.152 
(4.72)** 
           
 
Fixed Effects Industry-by-year Industry-by-year Industry-by-year Industry-by-year 
Observations 63672 64256 64099 63515 
Notes: Table displays coefficients and t-statistics for Heckman selection models (based on standard errors clustered on industry-destination-years).  Marginal effects are 
evaluated at sample means and for variations from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.  * and ** represent statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels. 
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Table 8: Counterfactual Experiments I 
 Annualised counterfactual change in aggregate export growth rate (%) 
 Heckman (Industry-Year FE) 
Counterfactual “Intensive” “Extensive” Total 
Poisson 
(Industry-
Year FE) 
OLS 
(Industry-
Year FE) 
Absorp. unchanged -3.31% -0.93% -3.99% -5.26% -3.12% 
- EU15 only -1.20% -0.14% -1.33% -1.99% -1.17% 
- Europe_other only -0.72% -0.22% -0.85% -1.05% -0.69% 
- NAFTA only -0.17% -0.05% -0.22% -0.28% -0.15% 
Unit lab. costs 
unchanged 
1.18% 0.09% 1.37% 0.86% 0.45% 
Exch. rates unchanged 1.46% 0.26% 2.00% 2.65% 1.50% 
- C&S America only 0.69% 0.18% 1.01% 1.19% 0.61% 
- All except C&S 
America 
0.70% 0.06% 0.90% 1.39% 0.64% 
Tariffs unchanged -0.21% -0.14% -0.34% -0.27% -0.32% 
CR unchanged 0.12% 0.04% 0.17% 0.35% 0.15% 
- No. exporters 0.04% 0.00% 0.04% 0.13% 0.06% 
- Exch. rates  -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% -0.02% -0.01% 
- Tariffs 0.03% 0.01% 0.04% 0.07% 0.03% 
- Unit lab. costs 0.06% 0.03% 0.08% 0.15% 0.06% 
Notes: Table reports annualised differences in growth rates between the counterfactual scenario indicated in the 
first column and actual export growth rates. Results are based on coefficient estimates obtained via the estimation 
method indicated at the top of each column. See text for details.
29 
 
Table 9: Counterfactual Experiments II 
 Annualised counterfactual change in aggregate export growth rate 
 Heckman (Industry-Year FE) 
Counterfactual “Intensive” “Extensive” Total 
Poisson 
(Industry-
Year FE) 
OLS 
(Industry-
Year FE) 
Chinese counterfactuals -0.13% -0.10% -0.20% -0.17% -0.09% 
- Absorption growth -0.09% -0.06% -0.13% -0.13% -0.05% 
- Market crowding 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 0.01% 
- Chinese import tariffs -0.04% -0.05% -0.09% -0.06% -0.04% 
- EUR/RMB exch. rate -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.00% 
Higher abs. growth EU15 0.45% 0.05% 0.51% 0.78% 0.49% 
Notes: Table reports annualised differences in growth rates between the counterfactual scenario indicated in the 
first column and actual export growth rates. Results are based on coefficient estimates obtained via the 
estimation method indicated at the top of each column. See text for details. 
 
 
